Cristin-resultat-ID: 1265923
Sist endret: 28. oktober 2015 18:32
NVI-rapporteringsår: 2015
Vitenskapelig artikkel

Price regulation and parallel imports of pharmaceuticals

  • Kurt Richard Brekke
  • Tor Helge Holmås og
  • Odd Rune Straume


Journal of Public Economics
ISSN 0047-2727
e-ISSN 1879-2316
NVI-nivå 2

Om resultatet

Vitenskapelig artikkel
Publiseringsår: 2015
Volum: 129
Sider: 92 - 105


Scopus-ID: 2-s2.0-84939818267

Beskrivelse Beskrivelse


Price regulation and parallel imports of pharmaceuticals


This paper studies the effects of price regulation and parallel imports in the on-patent pharmaceutical market. In a theory model where the producer price is subject to bargaining between the brand-name producer and a distributor, we show that the effects of stricter price regulation crucially depend on whether the producer faces competition from parallel imports. While parallel imports improve the bargaining position of the distributor, price regulation counteracts this effect and may even be profitable for the producer. We test the implications of our model on a unique dataset with information on sales and prices at both producer and retail level for 165 substances over 4 years (2004–2007). We show that stricter price regulation reduces competition from parallel imports, and has no (strictly negative) effect on producer profits in the presence (absence) of parallel imports. Our results suggest that price regulation might improve static efficiency without being harmful for dynamic efficiency in the presence of parallel imports.


Kurt Richard Brekke

  • Tilknyttet:
    ved Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi ved Norges Handelshøyskole

Tor Helge Holmås

  • Tilknyttet:
    ved NORCE Samfunn ved NORCE Norwegian Research Centre AS

Odd Rune Straume

  • Tilknyttet:
    ved Universidade do Minho
  • Tilknyttet:
    ved Institutt for økonomi ved Universitetet i Bergen
1 - 3 av 3