Cristin-resultat-ID: 1302343
Sist endret: 7. juni 2016, 12:33
NVI-rapporteringsår: 2016
Resultat
Vitenskapelig artikkel
2016

Against an Inferentialist Dogma

Bidragsytere:
  • Thomas Bainbridge Raleigh

Tidsskrift

Synthese
ISSN 0039-7857
e-ISSN 1573-0964
NVI-nivå 2

Om resultatet

Vitenskapelig artikkel
Publiseringsår: 2016
Publisert online: 2016

Importkilder

Scopus-ID: 2-s2.0-84952673505

Beskrivelse Beskrivelse

Tittel

Against an Inferentialist Dogma

Sammendrag

I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, 2000) and Ginsborg (Reasons for belief, 2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism.

Bidragsytere

Thomas Bainbridge Raleigh

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved King's College London
  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Institutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap ved Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet
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