Cristin-resultat-ID: 1550038
Sist endret: 23. januar 2018, 14:15
Resultat
Rapport
2009

Implementing Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation using Tradable Share Permits

Bidragsytere:
  • Helge Berglann

Utgiver/serie

Utgiver

Norsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk forskning

Serie

NILF Discussion Papers

Om resultatet

Rapport
Publiseringsår: 2009
Hefte: 2
Antall sider: 19
Open Access

Klassifisering

Vitenskapsdisipliner

Samfunnsøkonomi

Emneord

Skatteøkonomi

Beskrivelse Beskrivelse

Tittel

Implementing Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation using Tradable Share Permits

Sammendrag

This paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm’s income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm’s own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. These "shares of total expected output" lower a firm’s tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market. By employing this scheme, the planner only requires knowledge of marginal damage to induce the first-best outcome. Relative to a traditional cap-and-trade approach the system increases expected social welfare. If incentives for strategic behavior in the market exist, their impact may be scaled down.

Bidragsytere

Helge Berglann

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Divisjon for matproduksjon og samfunn ved Norsk institutt for bioøkonomi
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