Cristin-resultat-ID: 1854949
Sist endret: 9. september 2021, 15:36
NVI-rapporteringsår: 2020
Resultat
Vitenskapelig artikkel
2020

Administrative Delegation in Budgetary Powers and Fiscal Performance

Bidragsytere:
  • Benny Geys og
  • Rune Jørgen Sørensen

Tidsskrift

Kyklos (Basel)
ISSN 0023-5962
e-ISSN 1467-6435
NVI-nivå 1

Om resultatet

Vitenskapelig artikkel
Publiseringsår: 2020
Publisert online: 2020
Trykket: 2020
Volum: 73
Hefte: 4
Sider: 477 - 499
Open Access

Beskrivelse Beskrivelse

Tittel

Administrative Delegation in Budgetary Powers and Fiscal Performance

Sammendrag

Does delegation of the budget preparation process to top civil servants improve or worsen fiscal performance? We address this question by analyzing high‐quality data on budgetary procedures and fiscal performance over a 25‐year period in Norwegian local governments. This long time period allows exploiting substantial variation in budgetary procedures across time and space. The results show that administrative delegation decreases fiscal deficits as a share of current revenues. Compared to procedures relying on political coordination or the traditional ‘bottom‐up’ procedure, deficits are approximately 0.3 percentage points lower on average under administrative delegation. Still, this effect is conditional upon the presence of minority governments and fails to materialize when the mayor enjoys majority support in the local council. Our results thus indicate that administrative delegation in budgetary processes may constitute an important tool to alleviate poor fiscal performance arising due to political coordination failures and weak political decision‐making.

Bidragsytere

Benny Geys

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi ved Handelshøyskolen BI

Rune Jørgen Sørensen

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi ved Handelshøyskolen BI
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