When kindness generates unkindness. Why positive framing cannot solve the tragedy of the commons - an experimental investigation

We replicate the result by Andreoni (1995) that contributions to a linear public good (PG) are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively. We further show that this finding does not carry over to a non-linear PG game or the common pool resource (CPR) game. We find that the presence of a framing effect is largely affected by whether a social dilemma features strategic interactions. In the linear PG game, the best response is always to contribute nothing, and hence, independent of actions by others. With reciprocal preferences, however, contributions serve as strategic complements and kindness generates more kindness. With multiple equilibria a positive frame facilitates cooperators to coordinate on a cooperative equilibrium. In the CPR game and the non-linear PG game, the best response would be to contribute less if others contribute more. The material incentives hence counteract the effect of reciprocity, and the frame no longer serves as a coordination device. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons. Further, we find that rivalry, as present in the CPR, is eroding the foundation of reciprocal interactions as the ones who contribute most are the ones who benefit least. In line with these results, we find that cooperation is highest in the linear PG game, and lowest in the CPR game.