Cristin-resultat-ID: 1552184
Sist endret: 15. november 2018, 11:38
NVI-rapporteringsår: 2018
Resultat
Vitenskapelig artikkel
2018

Transcendental Paralogisms as Formal Fallacies – Kant’s Refutation of Rational Psychology

Bidragsytere:
  • Toni Kannisto

Tidsskrift

Kant-Studien
ISSN 0022-8877
e-ISSN 1613-1134
NVI-nivå 2

Om resultatet

Vitenskapelig artikkel
Publiseringsår: 2018
Publisert online: 2018
Trykket: 2019
Volum: 109
Hefte: 2
Sider: 195 - 227
Open Access

Importkilder

Scopus-ID: 2-s2.0-85048856389

Beskrivelse Beskrivelse

Tittel

Transcendental Paralogisms as Formal Fallacies – Kant’s Refutation of Rational Psychology

Sammendrag

According to Kant, the arguments of rational psychology are formal fallacies that he calls transcendental paralogisms. It remains heavily debated whether there actually is any formal error in the inferences Kant presents: according to Grier and Allison, they are deductively invalid syllogisms, whereas Bennett, Ameriks, and Van Cleve deny that they are formal fallacies. I advance an interpretation that reconciles these extremes: transcendental paralogisms are sound in general logic but constitute formal fallacies in transcendental logic. By formalising the paralogistic inference, I will pinpoint the error as an illegitimate existential presupposition. Since - unlike transcendental logic - general logic abstracts from all objects, this error can only be detected in transcendental logic.

Bidragsytere

Toni Tapio Kannisto

Bidragsyterens navn vises på dette resultatet som Toni Kannisto
  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Institutt for filosofi, idé- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk ved Universitetet i Oslo
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