Cristin-resultat-ID: 1933733
Sist endret: 7. februar 2022, 14:03
NVI-rapporteringsår: 2021
Resultat
Vitenskapelig artikkel
2021

Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort

Bidragsytere:
  • Gary W. Cox
  • Jon H. Fiva
  • Daniel M. Smith og
  • Rune Jørgen Sørensen

Tidsskrift

Journal of Public Economics
ISSN 0047-2727
e-ISSN 1879-2316
NVI-nivå 2

Om resultatet

Vitenskapelig artikkel
Publiseringsår: 2021
Publisert online: 2021
Trykket: 2021
Volum: 200
Open Access

Beskrivelse Beskrivelse

Tittel

Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort

Sammendrag

How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.

Bidragsytere

Gary W. Cox

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Stanford University
Aktiv cristin-person

Jon Hernes Fiva

Bidragsyterens navn vises på dette resultatet som Jon H. Fiva
  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi ved Handelshøyskolen BI

Daniel M. Smith

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Columbia University in the City of New York

Rune Jørgen Sørensen

  • Tilknyttet:
    Forfatter
    ved Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi ved Handelshøyskolen BI
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