The Donbas War at Eight Years: Autopsy of a Failed Peace Process

Despite persistent diplomatic pressure from the outside world, the ceasefire agreements signed in Belarus in September 2014 and February 2015, known as "Minsk I" and "Minsk II", did not succeed in bringing the Donbas conflict to a peaceful resolution. The diplomatic endeavors failed to lay the basis for a functioning ceasefire and a resolution of the underlying political issues. On February 21 this year, Russia formally recognized the self-proclaimed "people’s republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk as "independent states", and shortly after, on February 24, Russia embarked on a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In order to get a better understanding of why and how the Minsk process failed, we need to take a closer look at the complex nature of the conflict, the process through which the Minsk agreements came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of the agreements, and practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of the measures listed therein. Theoretical insights from the "negotiation studies" literature may add to our understanding of the diplomatic processes that took place prior to the signing of the Minsk agreements as well as the political and practical difficulties that the parties have been facing in the subsequent implementation phase.