'Non-scientific naturalism?'

In this paper, I explore the possibilities for non-scientific naturalism (NSN), i.e. a position that sees itself as naturalistic without cleaving to a scientific view of the world, or to the ascendany of scientific method. I trace a dialectical path through various arguments, replies and counter-arguments leading to a conclusion that this is a very difficult position to sustain. The basic argument for NSN stems from the inadequacy of physicalism - the thesis that all truths are physical truths - to account for everyday facts about the mind, justification, etc., a state of affairs that allegedly speaks, not for anti-naturalism, but for a non-scientific form of naturalism. However, this argument is flawed insofar as physicalism is no part of science (I argue). Two kinds of ripostes are available to supporters of SNS: i) facts about the mind, unlike those of other special sciences, are a priori irreducible to physics because of certain special features, such as normativity, holism etc., which demarcate psychology from any scientific form of understanding; ii) once naturalism gives up on a metaphysical or methodological foundationalism, the idea that every cognitive inquiry is or should be scientific is either empty or unfounded, and philosophy can go on much as before. Riposte i) is flawed insofar as none of what is meant to be special about psychology in fact demaracates it from forms of understanding that are recognizably scientific. Riposte ii) is also unconvincing: The extant science we have claims to give an understanding of mind and knowledge, such that an autonomously philosophical understanding of these things is precluded. This might seem simply to lead to a stand-off between the cognitive scientist and the philosopher who acknowledges no naturalistic constraint on her theories. However, the philosopher we are considering also accepts science, at some level. Further, given that the cognitive scientist can with some plausibility explain what philosophical acitivity involves, whereas the philosopher cannot obviously explain away the scientist’s scepticism to philosophical ideas that cannot be thus accounted for, the most reasonable standpoint would seem to be that there is an asymmetric dependency of philosophy on science; that the former must be understood within the framework provided by the latter.